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Summary findings
The economies of Latin America have undergone  older and more educated men. With respect to wages,
extensive reforms, raising concerns about how these  density and quantile regression analysis indicates that the
changes have affected the labor market. But there is also  usual stories of wage marginalization of vulnerable
increasing concern that the reforms may have deeper  workers can hardly explain the observed variety of wage
social ramifications as the new economies strain the  growth patterns in the three countries. The positive wage
ability of certain groups of men to work and to earn  performance has been concentrated  mainly in the higher
good wages, fulfilling their traditional role as providers.  quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. This
Using household surveys broadly covering the period  suggests that differences in unobservable worker
1988-97 in urban areas of Argentina, Brazil, and Costa  characteristics, such as industriousness, labor market
Rica, Arias examines the patterns of unemployment and  connections, and quality of schooling, have been key
real wage growth for distinct groups of male workers to  determinants of the ability of male workers in the region
see whether there is evidence of a deterioration  in men's  to adapt to economic restructuring.
ability to be economically self-sufficient. He finds no  These results suggest that assistance should be targeted
general trend of male economic marginalization.  to some groups so that frustrations in asserting an
The incidence and duration of unemployment have  economic identity do not lead to aggressive behavior. But
increased the most for the typically vulnerable group-  they also show that we must look elsewhere for the roots
young, less educated, informal sector workers-but  the  of the increase in socially dysfunctional behavior.
increased duration  of unemployment has also affected
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Since the  late  1980s, macroeconomic  stabilization in  the  Latin  America  and
Caribbean (LAC) region has been followed by the acceleration of structural market-based
reforms  and  increasing integration into the global economy.  Economic restructuring
driven by these so-called "second generation" reforms include trade, fiscal and financial
reforms, privatization of public enterprises and provision of some social services, and
deregulation of the economy to align prices with market forces.  In the transition to a
more productive economy, jobs in traditionally protected sectors are replaced by jobs in
new more competitive sectors, existing skills become obsolete and sectoral productivity
shifts revamp the structure of wages.
While female workers have also been affected (Saavedra, 1999), there is increasing
concern that this process may have strained the capability of certain groups of men to
fulfill  their traditional  socially prescribed role as "providers"  in the family  and  thus
challenged their self-identity.  Barker (1998) reports on research suggesting that men's
employment  status  and  eamings  affect  their  decisions  about  family  formation,
continuation, and ties to their children.  Further qualitative sociological work has linked
increasing violence, alcoholism, and substance abuse among some men in the region to
the challenges that economic changes pose to their "breadwinner" role (Barker, 1998).
Although often focused on non-randomly-selected vulnerable male subpopulations
(e.g., low-income young men), this sociological research alludes to  overall trends  of
declining  male  labor  force  participation,  and  increasing  unemployment  or  wage
deterioration of these specific groups as evidence of economic intramale marginalization.
However,  it  has  not  been  carefully ascertained whether  or not  this  presumed  male
economic marginalization is indeed an economy-wide phenomenon. In fact, the standard
economic  theory  (e.g.,  Hecksher-Ohlin) behind  ongoing  reforms  predict  that  more
vulnerable  workers  (ie., the  unskilled)  should benefit  the  most.  Although  contrary
evidence points  to an  increase in wage  inequality in many Latin American countries
during the  1980s and early  1990s ,  trends  in recent years have been less researched.
Moreover, while unemployment is a cause of increasing concern and, overall, real wages
have been on the rise in most of the region in the  1990s, little work has focused  on
changes in intramale differentials.  More micro-level research is thus needed to carefully
examine  the  hypothesis  of  intra-male  marginalization  during  recent  economic
restructuring in various countries in the region.
In this study we use evidence from available household surveys broadly covering
the period 1988-97 in urban areas of Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica.  We carefully
examine the following questions: 1) Is there evidence of  deterioration in the  income
generation capacity of certain groups of men? 2) Have certain groups of men lagged
behind in accruing any of the wage growth entailed by economic reforms? 3) What are
their socioeconomic and labor market characteristics?.
Although we characterize employment and  unemployment patterns, we mainly
rely on  a very detailed analysis of changes in the wage  structure in  these countries.
'See  for example Robbins (1997) and Cragg and Epelbaum (1996).
2Wages are a key determinant of labor force participation, incomes, and poverty, and are
the ultimate indicators of the quality ofjobs in reforming economies.
We exarnine changes in the whole distribution of wages and not just average wage
trends.  Specifically, we characterize changes in the wage distributions of distinct groups
of workers using kernel density estimation and quantile methods.  We are especially
interested in the evolution of real wages of those "typical" individual males located at the
bottom quantiles of the wage distribution, particularly workers who earn wages lower
than predicted by their demographic characteristics and observable levels of skills.  A
focus on "average" wage trends may obscure the particular conditions that affect these
men.
One of  our main findings indeed suggests that positive wage performance has
been mainly concentrated at the higher quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. The
dynamics  generating wage  gains  for  particular groups  or  workers employed  in  the
expanding sectors have often eluded workers in the less privileged jobs,  that is, those
earning wages lower than predicted by measured characteristics.  Thus the unobservable
heterogeneity that  varies across groups of  workers (e.g., differences  in  ability, labor
market connections, quality of schooling) affects non-trivially the capacity to  adapt to
economic restructuring and thus can generate differences in labor market performance.
While the analysis does not  attempt to  establish causal connections with reforms  and
other parallel changes in these economies, it offers a richer characterization of recent
wage trends and pinpoints which groups of men have lost or won.  This  is of critical
importance for the design of equity-enhancing policies and safety nets to protect workers
excluded during economic transitions with potential added social benefits in crime and
violence reduction.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the choice of countries and
time  periods,  and  briefly  describes  the  main  economic  reforms  and  economic
performance of each country.  Section 3 describes the methodology and the data.  Section
4 characterizes overall trends  in  male labor market  outcomes, specifically trends  and
patterns  of  male  employment, unemployment and  real  wages.  Section  5  discusses
quantile  wage  regression  results.  Section  6  concludes  and  suggests  some  policy
implications.
2.  Background:  Reforms and Economic Performance
Although  structural  reforms  have  dominated  policymaking  in  virtually  all
economies in  the region since the  mid-1980s, there are  important differences  in the
intensity, pace and degree of success.  We focus on the experiences of Argentina, Brazil
and Costa Rica to study intramale economic marginalization. 2 As in most of the region,
policy reform in these three countries has aimed to  stabilize and provide a  long-term
solution to  macroeconomic crises characterized by historically high  rates of inflation,
fiscal and trade deficits and economic decay.  Nevertheless, they illustrate some of the
2 The original  design  also  included  Colombia  to attempt  exploring  indigenous  issues  and connections  to
violence,  and  the Dominican  Republic  to illustrate  a Caribbean  experience.  Unfortunately,  we could  not
obtain  the relevant  labor  survey  data timely.
3regional diversity in reform experiences, from the early but gradual Costa Rican process,
the swift and sustained Argentine program, and the stop-go nature of the Brazilian reform
approach.  Furthermore, these countries capture some of the considerable diversity in
economic structure across the region, from the relatively large industrial sectors with a
relatively skilled labor force in Argentina and a less skilled workforce in Brazil, to the
smaller scale maquilas, bigger service orientation, and continuing welfare state tradition
that backs a well educated labor force in the small Costa Rican economy.
We  consider  two  years  covering  a  period  of  more  intense  reform  efforts,
specifically the periods  1988-97 for Argentina, and  1989-95 for Brazil and Costa Rica.
Although some began earlier (in the mid-late 1980s), economic reforms were introduced
or deepened to varying degrees during these periods.  Although this only allows a rough
snapshot of the labor markets in two points in time, these years take into account the
general trends during the periods.  They are also chosen to  control for business cycle
fluctuations  (as  measured  by GDP  growth and  inflation  trends)  and  maximize  data
comparability both within and across countries. 3
Here  we  briefly outline  the  major macroeconomic changes and  reforms  that
operated  in  the three economies during these periods.  Rather than a  comprehensive
account, we focus on the key developments  that may have affected labor markets. 4
Argentina
The cornerstone of the Argentine economic policy program during the period was
the convertibility plan.  The key to this plan, introduced in  1991, was a new monetary
system based  on a fully convertible exchange rate regime which fixed the rate  of the
Argentine peso at 1:1 to the US dollar and abolished all capital and exchange controls.  It
also comprised a wide variety of structural adjustment measures including public sector,
trade, and financial reforms that were accompanied by a massive program of privatization
and deregulation of the economy.  For instance, from the late 1980s to  1991 the average
protection of tariffs and paratariffs declined from 28 to  15 percent, to a range of 0-22
percent down from  0-55 percent. 5 Between 1989 and  1992, a total of  51 firms were
privatized and  employment in public enterprises declined drastically from 250,000 to
60,000 employees. 6
According to  Pessino  (1997) the  major developments  in the  Argentine  labor
market associated with the implementation of the convertibility plan during this period
were: 1) an increase in the relative price of labor with respect to capital, motivated by the
3We  pick 1988 as starting year for Argentina despite the recession because inflation was relatively lower
and since the reform program was started in 1991. Both real wages and unemployment rose during 1988-91
and 1991-95, declined during 1995-97,  but remained higher in 1997 than during 1988-95 so that a 1997 vs.
1988 comparison reveals the period dominant trend.  For a year-to-year analysis of male real wages and
unemployment in Argentina, see Arias (1999).
4 For a comprehensive review of the reforn  and adjustment process in the region see Edwards (1995) and
IDB  (1997).  For country-specific studies, see for instance World Bank (1996), Report No. 15402-Ar and
Pessino (1997) for Argentina, Cespedes and Jimenez (1994) for Costa Rica, and Baer (1995) for Brazil.
'Edwards  (1995).
6 op. cit.
4elimination of tariffs on capital goods and real appreciation of the peso; 2) an increase in
unemployment  and  underemployment  mainly  due  to  slow  employment  growth  but
aggravated  by  the  increase  in  labor  force  participation, particularly  of  women;  3)
technological change, presumably biased towards higher demand for skilled labor; 4) an
increase in average labor productivity which, however, has not been sufficient to reduce
unit  labor costs;  and  5)  very  slow progress in  the  reform of  onerous  labor market
regulations that block labor mobility and impose high fixed labor costs that  constrain
labor demand.
The initial success of the plan in quickly moving the economy from historical
levels  of  hyperinflation  (1989-90)  to  remarkable  price  stability  was  followed  by
remarkable sustained economic growth between 1990 and 1994 (around 35%), was halted
by the 1995 recession (-4%) triggered by the Mexican crisis (the "tequila effect"), but
resumed in steady growth between 1995 and  1997 (around 13%) still with remarkably
low levels of inflation and a curbed public sector deficit.
Brazil
The Brazilian reform process has been distressed by the divergent path of the
economy.  Despite numerous earlier stabilization plans, in 1990, inflation was still in the
triple digits and real GDP declined by 4.6 percent.  Structural reforms were introduced
parallel to the Collor Plan (1990), Collor Plan II, and a plan of orthodox measures (1992)
which attempted to eliminate rapid price increases through some combination of freezes
on assets, wages, and prices.  These led to a deep recession in  1990-92, followed by a
significant recovery in 1993. The Real Plan, of mid-1994, introduced a new currency (the
real) and tight monetary policy, and eliminated price and wage indexation, all of which
led to a decline in inflation from 5,000 percent per year in the first half of  1994 to 26
percent  in  1995, and  11 percent in  1996.  The currency stabilization and appreciation
triggered a spending boom in 1994-95, which led to GDP growth of 5.8%.
Reforms,  again,  consisted  largely  of  an  opening  of  the  economy,  financial
deregulation and privatization that accompanied fiscal reform, with no significant attempt
at labor market reform.  In 1990, under IMF pressure, liberalization was deepened  as
tariffs fell from an average of 32.2% in 1990 to 14% in 1993, so that from 1987 to 1992
the average degree of protection declined from 80 to 21.1%, with the dispersion reduced
from 0-105 to 0-65 percent.  Most of the adjustment was completed by 1994. As a result,
manufacturing employment declined sharply (37%) from 1990 to 1996, mostly right after
the tariff reduction, although unemployment still remained relatively low  (5%).7  The
privatization program, in which twenty-two state firms were privatized by 1992, has not
been as massive as in other countries in the region (e.g., Argentina). Finally, as a result of
financial deregulation, by 1993 interest rates and credit, to a lesser extent, were mostly
market determined, and barriers to entry in the financial market had been reduced.
By late 1995, under the fear of growing fiscal and external deficits, the economy
began to slow down again, averaging a growth rate of about 3 percent during  1994-97.
Fiscal imbalances remained a big problem, which were difficult to address due  to the
rigidities imposed by the  1988 Constitution  (which prohibits laying off public  sector
7 Chanon  (1998).
5workers).  However, privatization got a second wind in 1996 when public assets worth
nearly $6 billion were sold, and continued in  1997 with  further massive sales of large
public enterprises.
Costa Rica
Although Costa Rica was an early trade reformer, the reform process there has
been markedly gradual.  It was rooted in the severe crisis that peaked in  1982 with an
inflation rate of 90%, a sharp devaluation in the Colon, sizable fiscal and current account
deficits, and a 7.3% real decline in GDP.  After tough fiscal adjustment, Costa Rica has
positioned itself as one of the best performing economies in the region since 1983, with
an annual average growth rate of 4.3% and a 16% average rate of inflation between 1983
and 1990.
The key  areas of reform have been trade liberalization,  fiscal adjustment and
financial  deregulation.  Starting in  1985, tariffs were  gradually reduced to  reach  an
average degree of tariff and paratariff protection of 16% in 1993 down from 92%, to a
range of 5-20 percent down from 1-100 percent.  A program was initiated to promote
non-traditional exports with incentives such as tax breaks and import duty exemptions. A
policy of mini-devaluations of the Colon and lagging of minimum real wages to inflation
helped maintain export competitiveness.  Free zones and maquilas initiated a slow "high-
tech" transformation led by the initiation of construction of an Intel subsidiary in 1993.
Two bank liberalization laws were passed in 1988 and 1995 that ended the state banks'
monopoly and allowed private banks to expand their market share, and further financial
restructuring has recently been sought.
Although  much progress was made to  alleviate the  prohibitive external  debt
service, public sector reform was affected by fragile and intermittent political consensus.
It was mainly restricted to transitory measures to  curb public expenditure growth and
increase tax collection.  Privatization of public enterprises and social services has been
achieved only in recent years, due in part to the opposition of public sector unions.  In
1995 alone, public sector reorganization led to the elimination of 8,000 jobs, a reduction
in  state subsidies for teachers'  pension  scheme, and  an increase  in  tax rates.  Even
progress in trade reform was partially halted by an 8% increase in tariffs across the board
in  1995 as a "temporal" fiscal stabilization measure.  As  in most of the region, labor
market reform has yet to be firmly placed on the policy agenda.
The economy continued to exhibit positive growth every year between 1990 and
1995 (averaging 4.5%), especially during 1992-93, notwithstanding inflation (average of
20% per year) and growing fiscal and current account deficits that worsened the already
delicate  external  debt  situation.  In  1995, fiscal  restraint  within  an  IMF  stand-by
agreement led to a decline of 0.6% in growth, although inflation remained high at 17.5%.
Growth  resumed  in  1997  (3.2%)  with  a  deceleration  in  inflation  to  13.5%.
Unemployment remained rather low throughout the period, especially when compared
with regional trends of rising unemployment.
63.  Methodology and Data
3.1  Methodology
Often,  "marginalization" (of a  given subpopulation) is associated with  various
manifestations  of  poverty  such  as  a  high  proportion of  unsatisfied  basic  needs  or
insufficient income to purchase a basket of basic goods and services.  In this paper, we
focus directly on changes in male income generation capability to examine the hypothesis
of intramale economic marginalization.  Clearly, this depends on the ability to  secure
stable and good quality employment.
Overall,  economic  reforms  bring  the  promise  of  enhancing  the  economy's
potential to generate new jobs and higher real wages through labor productivity boosts.
More  efficient  labor  markets  are  expected  to  create  productive  employment  that
simultaneously raises living standards for workers and improves firms'  competitiveness.
However, it is very difficult to accurately predict  and measure the impact on specific
labor market outcomes of the set of reforms implemented in these countries.
First, alternative explanations yield opposing theoretical predictions depending on
specific  country  characteristics related to  initial  endowments and  characteristics that
affect internal markets operation.  For instance, standard trade theory (e.g., Heckscher-
Ohlin and  Stolper-Samuelson) predicts that trade liberalization in developing countries
should increase the relative wages of unskilled (the abundant factor) relative to  skilled
workers.  However,  it is  also argued that the  technological change that  comes with
increased  openness  is  biased against  unskilled  labor  and  thus  augments  skill  wage
premiums.  The evidence on this is far from conclusive. 8 Second, other reforms may
have countervailing effects.  For instance, labor market deregulation (e.g., reduction  in
the power of unions or minimum wage coverage) may eliminate wage rents enjoyed by
specific groups of workers.
Most crucially, the net benefits of reforms are fully granted only in the long run.
In the transition, some job destruction takes place and real wages must adjust to changing
patterns of demand and skills scarcity.  Certain workers may end up bearing most of the
cost of adjustment through higher and persistent unemployment or employment in jobs of
lower  real  compensations and  may be  further  excluded  from  the  growth-enhancing
benefits of reforms.  Given the relatively short spans of time considered, examination of
such transition or perhaps more permanent outcomes is what we aim at here.
Specifically, to address the question posed above, we analyze the incidence and
duration of unemployment as well as detail patterns  of real wage growth for distinct
groups of male workers in the three countries.  Although we consider trends  in both
unemployment and wages, we mainly focus on changes over time in the distribution of
wages as our key indicator of intramale economic marginalization.  As  wages are the
prices for different kinds of labor, they are a key determinant of labor force participation,
and  of  current and  potential  income through  the  accumulation of  assets  and  human
8 See,  for  instance,  Learner  (1997),  Berman,  Bound  and  Machin  (1997),  Robbins  (1997)  and  Wood  (1997)
for  a discussion  of  the  literature  and  reference  to related  work  for  developed  economies.
7capital.  Moreover, they are the ultimate indicators of the quality of jobs  generated by
reforming economies.
Conventional  analysis of  changes in  the wage  structure typically  focuses  on
changes  in  average  wages for  distinct  skill  groups of  workers.  For  instance,  in  a
regression setting least squares methods can yield (counterfactual) estimates of average
wage  differentials between workers that differ only in their education levels.  Recent
empirical work in  labor economics has pointed out the limitations of  this  approach. 9
Unobservable heterogeneity that  varies across groups of  workers (e.g.,  differences in
ability, family labor market connections, quality of schooling) is likely to  affect labor
market performance and the capacity to adapt to economic restructuring in a non-trivial
way.  For instance,  if the creation of new more productive jobs  (of a given  skill) is
sluggish, only those with more spunk or from better connected families may manage to be
favorably re-employed in the higher wage jobs,  while increased labor redundancy may
drive down wages of workers in less favorable jobs.
Therefore,  a  focus  on  "average"  wage  trends  may  obscure  the  particular
conditions that affect these men.  We focus on characterization of changes in the whdle
distribution  of  wages  rather than  on  average wage  trends.  We  shall be  especially
interested in the evolution of real wages of those "typical" individual males located at the
bottom quantiles of the wage distribution, or more generally those workers who earn
wages  lower  than  granted  by  their  observable  levels  of  skills  and  demographic
characteristics.
For this, we estimate wage densities for several broadly defined groups of male
workers and  use  quantile regression  (Koenker  and  Bassett,  1978) to  estimate  wage
differentials between workers in different points of the wage distribution given observed
characteristics.  For each year, we estimate regressions of the log of wages on the set of
dummy  variables  for  six  quantiles  (0.05,  0.1,0.25,0.5,0.75,0.9)  and  two  different
specifications.'I  Conventional least squares (mean) regressions are obtained for reference
and  often yield  results  similar  to  median  regression.  The  change  in  the  resulting
"adjusted" quantile wage differentials across the two periods are compared with the "raw"
real wage growth rates obtained from a simpler age-education cell analysis.  These are
then used to identify male workers whose wages are lagging behind in the new economy
along the entire wage distribution.
The analysis contrasts the evolution of wages across workers that differ in their
endowment of general  (education, experience) and specific (industry, occupation) skills
and in demographic factors which influence wages (race, marital/headship  status).  An
important characteristic of labor markets in the region is that  a large  segment of the
workforce is "informal", that is, operates outside formal regulatory structures.  Often seen
9 See  for  instance  Buchinsky  (1994),  Mwabu  and  Schultz  (1996),  Arias,  Hallock  and  Sosa  (1999),  Machado
and  Mata  (1999),  Maloney  and  Ribeiro  (1999).
'° All  the  estimations  and  tests  were  carried  out  in Splus  V.  4.5.  In Brazil  quantile  regressions  are  estimated
using  recently  developed  interior  point  algorithms  due  to the  large  sample  sizes.  All  the  reported  test
statistics  are  based  on  related  regression  rank  score  procedures.  See  Appendix  II for a brief  description  of
the  techniques.  Koenker  and  Portnoy  (1997)  for  a detailed  discussion  of quantile  methods.
8as a repository of workers unable to find employment in the formal sector who often have
to cope with  lower wages, this  sector includes the self-employed (cuenta propia)  and
workers in small firms lacking social protection schemes such as health insurance and
work benefits, albeit there is no consensus on precise definitions.  Although this view has
recently been challenged, 1'  we also contrast the evolution of informal and formal wages
as another potential dimension of intramale economic marginalization' 2 .
Overall,  we  shall  interpret  as  key  evidence  of  wage  marginalization:  1)  a
systematic decline, in the level of wages of a given group of workers relative to overall
wage trends, and  2) a change in the wage distribution, not compensated by an increase in
wage levels, that iincreases  the proportion of workers (in the population or within a given
group) in low-wage jobs.
We do not attempt to address the considerably more difficult task of sorting out
the causal factors underlying the observed labor market outcomes.  This would require a
rather different approach.  The results below do provide a rich account of key trends that
require further exploration in future research.
3.2  Data
We use available data from national household surveys covering urban areas for
each initial and end year in the relevant periods.  These are the Encuesta Permanente de
Hogares (EPH) in Argentina (1988, 1997) covering Greater Buenos Aires, the Pesquisa
Nacional por Amnostra  de Domicilios (PNAD) in Brazil and the Encuesta de Hogares de
Prop6sitos Multiples (EHPM) in Costa Rica (1989, 1995).'3
The analysis only considers males who report being salaried workers or self-employed
(cuenta propia)  and age 15 to 70, thereby excluding owners of small firms and unpaid
family workers.  1 4 The wage analysis is based on hourly wages for men who report a
positive number of hours of work and earnings in the main occupation.  Real wages are
computed in 1988 pesos in Argentina, 1989 pesos in Costa Rica, and 1989 US dollars in
"See Maloney  (1998a, 1998b)  for a discussion  of the labor  market  segmentation  hypothesis  in LDCs.
12 Regressions  are run  on the pooled  sample  of salaried  and self-employed  workers.  Although  this  restricts
sectoral  wage  differentials  to be independent  of observable  characteristics,  it allows  a direct  assessment  of
the relative  wage  performance  of workers  across  sectors  after adjusting  for such characteristics.  Moreover,
the smaller  sizes cf the informal  samples  may  result in noisier  statistical  inferences.
13  In Argentina,  we  merge  the May and October  waves  of the EPH surveys  in  each year  to obtain  bigger
sample  sizes. In Brazil,  the 1995  PNAD  does not allow  to distinguish  between  urban and  rural areas. In
order  to enhance  comparability  over  time,  the 1995  sample  for Brazil  covers  only  the largest  metropolitan
centers  (Rio, Sao  Paulo,  Minas  Gerais,  Parana,  Pernambuco,  Bahia  and Ceara)  and exclude  agricultural
workers.  For Costa  Rica we  only  include  individuals  living  in metropolitan  areas.
14  The relevant  population  for inference  purposes  is the employed  male  population,  which  may  or may  not
be representative  of the whole  male population  of workers  in the labor  force  (including  the unemployed).
However,  biases  arising  from self-selection  into  the labor  force  are typically  not as big a concern  for men  as
for women.  Atterapts  to correct  for self-selection  into  to the labor  force  or for correlation  between
unobservable  determinants  of unemployment  spells  and wage  equation  regressors  using  parametric  sample
selection  methods  (e.g., Heckman,  1979)  are increasingly  recognized  as unsatisfactory  due to the sensitivity
of the approach  to statistical  assumptions.
9Brazil.  We drop observations with inconsistent income reports and missing data on any
of the variables of interest.  16
Worker characteristics are captured by dummy variables to  facilitate isolating
changes  in  counterfactual  wage  distributions  for  narrowly defined  groups  based  on
human capital attributes such as age, education, occupational skills and tenure (only in
Argentina), job  characteristics as captured by category'7 and sector of employment, and
other regional (except Argentina) and demographic controls (i.e., marital and headship
status, and race in Brazil).'8 In the central specification'9, which is based on nine age-
education (skill) groups, the comparison (control) groups used to  assess relative wage
performance correspond to single, white (in Brazil), non-head, professional workers older
than 45 with college or more, more than 10 years of tenure (in Argentina), employed in
financial/business services and formal sector firms.  In Brazil and Costa Rica, the richest
region is used as base (Southeast and Central, respectively).
4.  Overall Labor Market Trends
We first briefly describe the main trends in male labor market outcomes in each
country. 20 We begin with changes in the patterns of labor force and sectoral participation,
and changes in the characteristics of the work force by sector of employment.  We then
examine the incidence and duration of unemployment as well as real wage changes for
broad age and education groups.
4.1  Labor Force Participation and Work force Characteristics
Table 1 presents statistics on male labor force and sectoral participation by groups
of  workers  in  the  three  countries.  Overall,  labor  force participation  increased  in
Argentina  and Costa Rica and declined in  Brazil during the relevant periods, but  the
changes are all less than 1 percentage point.  Less than half of younger men (age 15-20)
participate  in  Argentina and  Costa Rica,  and  a  somewhat higher proportion  does  in
Brazil.  Their participation declined in Argentina and Brazil, presumably as a result of
more continuity in schooling, but increased slightly in Costa Rica.  Participation of those
age 20-25 is considerably higher and increased significantly in Costa Rica and Argentina
but  declined  in  Brazil.  Virtually  all  middle-age  men  (prime  age  and  age  35-45)
15 We use  national  currencies  to avoid  the measurement  problems  that  trade imbalances  (which  often
pervaded  in these  economies)  may  cause  to US dollars  conversions.  However,  due to the numerous  changes
in currency  in Brazil  during  the period  of hyperinflation  the US dollar  translation  was deemed  more
appropriate.  IPCs  are used  to obtain  real  values.
16 Estimates  of labor  market  statistics  were  not significantly  affected  by exclusion  of these  non-responses.
17 This  measures  differences  in  wages  across  sectors  that  are unaccounted  by observable  characteristics.
However,  as stressed  by Maloney  (1998a, 1998b),  these  cannot  be interpreted  as evidence  of existence  of a
dual labor  market.  Earnings  differentials  arising  from different  taxation,  unobservable  entrepreneurial
ability,  tastes differences  are all likely  to affect  individual  sectoral  choices  of employment  and  this effect
can be confounded  with  any  "true" sectoral  differences  in earnings.
is See Appendix  I for precise  definitions  of all variables  across  countries.
19  The second  specification,  not discussed  further,  differentiates  between  complete  and incomplete  degrees
but do not use age-education  interactions.  Workers  age 35-45  with  college  or more serve  as a control  group.
This is not discussed  further  since  the results  are consistent  with  those reported  here.
20 Saavedra  (1999)  characterizes  overall  trends  in female  labor  market  outcomes.
10participate steadily.  Interestingly, participation rates increased in all three countries for
older men (age 45-70), notably in Argentina, in part due to an increased retirement age.
Both men with a primary education or less and those with higher education significantly
increased their participation in Argentina and Costa Rica, and reduced it in Brazil.  The
participation of men with secondary education changed very little.
Consistent  with  regional  trends,  in  all  three  countries  these  labor  force
participation  trends  have  coupled  with  a  shrinkage in  the  formal  sector  share  of
employment, which reflects an increase in the share of informality (defined as informal
salaried work and. self-employment) in Argentina (by 2-3 percentage points), informal
salaried jobs  in Costa Rica (by I percentage point), and mostly of self-employment in
Brazil (from 19% to 26%).  By the end of the relevant periods, informal employment is
largest in Brazil (43%), followed by Argentina (37%) and remains much smaller in Costa
Rica (30%).
Table  2 presents  statistics describing the composition  of employment  in  each
sector according t:o  various worker characteristics. The general skill composition of each
sector changes to reflect an increasingly more educated and aging labor force, with some
country-specific variation.  Formal sector employment is mainly comprised of middle-age
(25-45 years) workers with primary and secondary schooling and to a lesser extent higher
education. The sector increasingly accommodates more educated (secondary and higher)
workers within the middle age group, as well as young workers with college or more in
the case of Argentina and Costa Rica.  The informal salaried sector is mostly comprised
of  (any  age)  workers  with  primary  education and  young  middle-age  workers  with
secondary education. In Argentina and Brazil, the sector shows a growing preponderance
of middle-age workers with secondary education, and in Costa Rica of professionals and
workers with higher education.  Self-employment is the main sector of choice of middle-
age  and  older  workers with  primary  education and  middle-age  with  secondary, but
increasingly  accommodates  more  middle-age  and  older,  better  educated  workers,
especially in Argentina.
The data available for Argentina on tenure in occupation indicates that the formal
sector increasingly comprises a mix of workers with some experience (less than 5 years of
tenure) in their occupation and more experience (more than 10 years), while the informal
salaried sector largely comprises new workers (less than one year in current occupation).
Self-employment went from being mainly a refuge of more senior workers to comprising
mostly new workers with some experience.  Data on general labor market experience for
1995 in  Brazil. are  broadly consistent  with  these  patterns,  but  suggest  that  sectoral
differences in general experience may not be as large. 2'
Formal employment is mainly comprised of manufacturing, public administration
and  social services, retail and  transportation/communication/public utilities.  Infornal
employment is  mostly comprised  of jobs  in  retail,  construction,  manufacturing,  and
personal services, and a relatively larger share of financial service jobs  among the self-
21 This  refers  to the usual  exp=  (age-education-6)  computation,  although  here this is based  on workers'
report of the age  they  began to work, which  is available  in the 1995  Brazilian  survey.
11employed.  Shrinking employment in the manufacturing sector, presumably driven by
economic  reforms,  has  coupled with  rising  employment in:  a)  formal  and  informal
transportation/telecommunication  and  financial/business  services,  informal  personal
services in Argentina, b) formal personal services in Brazil (with infornal  manufacturing
employment  changing  very  little),  c)  formal  retail  and  financial/business  services,
infornal  transportation/telecommunication, social  services, and  financial/business and
personal services in Costa Rica.
4.2  Unemployment
Consistent with the region, job creation in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica has
been considerably sluggish in the 1990s. As shown in Table 1, male unemployment rates
increased in  all three countries, especially in Argentina where it soared from  5.4% to
13.4%, followed by Brazil (4.7% to 7.6%) and much less in Costa Rica (4.5% to 5.8%).
Strikingly, in Argentina the highest increases in unemployment were born by the informal
salaried (6.1% to 18.3%) and the self-employed (7.4% to  18%), compared to a rise from
4% to 8.8% among the formal salaried.  In contrast, the likelihood of becoming jobless
increased for formal sector workers in Brazil (4.4% to  8.4%) and Costa Rica (4.8% to
6%), declined for the informal salaried (6.8% to 2.6% and 11.7% to 10%, respectively),
and remained low for the self-employed. 22
Young (age 15-25) workers account for more than half of the unemployed in all
three countries and show a rising probability of unemployment that doubles the national
rates, going from 11.2% to 23.6% in Argentina, 8.2% to  14.6% in Brazil, and 9.4% to
12.4% in  Costa  Rica.  Unemployment is also  higher and  rose  among workers with
primary education or less in Argentina (6.9% to  17.7%) and Costa Rica (5.2% to 7%),
and for those with secondary or less in Brazil (5.6% to 8.5%).23 In addition, though they
still remained lower, unemployment rates among workers with  higher education rose
more rapidly over the period, becoming four times higher in Argentina, three times higher
in Brazil, and twice as high in Costa Rica.
The average  24 duration of unemployment spells also increased in Argentina (from
10.6 to  20.3 weeks),  increased much less in  Costa  Rica 25 (62%  of the  unemployed
remained jobless after 8 weeks, up from 52%) and decreased in Brazil (from 14.1 to  11.7
weeks).  It increased significantly among formnal  sector workers in Argentina (from 10.6
to 24 weeks) and Costa Rica, but also increased considerably among the informal salaried
in Argentina (from 6.4 to 16.6 weeks).  The longer durations in Argentina and Costa Rica
have not affected the self-employed. Persistent unemployment became even more intense
among the elderly in Argentina (14.5 to 24.8 weeks) and Brazil (15.8 to 19.3 weeks), and
remained high in Costa Rica (75% of the elderly unemployed remained unemployed after
22 This  is based  on the unemployed's  last sector  of employment,  which  is available  in  all three  country
surveys.
23 This  difference  may be in part due to differences  in the degree  structure  of the education  system  in Brazil.
See Appendix I for details.
24 Median durations (not reported) are somewhat lower and change less over time, suggesting a high
variance in long- termn  unemployment spells within age and education groups.
25 Unemployment duration is coded in week intervals in the Costa Rican survey.
128 weeks).  However, unemployment duration increased proportionally  more for the young
and middle-aged  in  Argentina and Costa  Rica, while it declined for  these groups in
Brazil.  Workers wvith  higher education experienced much longer unemployment spells in
Argentina (11.3 to 33.7 weeks) and to a lesser extent Costa Rica, but significantly shorter
spells in Brazil.
While hardly surprising, the picture that emerges from the above cross-country
trends is suggesti ve of a systematic strain in the earnings capacity of specific male groups.
The well known decline in male labor force participation over the last three decades,
presumably  driven  by  higher  school  enrollment,  has  slowed  down  due  to  higher
participation  of  the  elderly.  With  eroding public  pensions  under  persistent  fiscal
constraints, this could reflect a need to supplement household incomes with the labor of
the elderly.
Unemployment is clearly an overarching expanding problem, especially among
the young and less educated, even in Costa Rica where it has long remained a smaller
cause for concern.  The higher prevalence of joblessness among informal workers  in
Argentina is  swuprising  but has been found in other work. 26 Most attention is usually
focused on the massive layoffs that are expected from the restructuring of big private
finns  and public sector retrenchment.  But this overlooks the situation of unprotected
workers who lose their jobs  in small firms that are wiped out by entering national or
transnational firms with a larger more efficient scale of operation.  Of particular concern
is the fact that tnemployment duration, which continues to be long for the elderly, is also
on the rise for the young (except in Brazil).  Therefore young and less educated informal
workers appear to be particularly vulnerable to employment fluctuations.
4.3  Real Wages
We now examine the behavior of real wages during the relevant periods in each
country.  Again, the analysis aims at pinpointing specific groups of workers who may
have been negatively affected or lagged behind during reform episodes.  We first examine
general trends  focusing on shifts in the entire wage distribution for salaried  and self-
employed workers separately. Then we uncover specific trends for broad age, education
and occupation groups.
4.3.1  Overall and Sectoral Changes in Wage Distributions
Table  3 presents the growth rates per year  of different quantiles  of  the wage
distribution in each sector as well as the corresponding sectoral wage differentials, and
Figure 1 compares the overall and sectoral wage densities over each period (one column
per country).
Some  interesting facts emerge  from cross-sectoral  comparisons.  In  all  three
countries, the self-employed wage distribution is notoriously more dispersed and  often
exhibits  rather  long  tails,  reflecting  the  heterogeneity  of  the  sector.  The  self-
employed/formal salaried wage gap shrinks monotonically towards the upper tail, turning
into a positive wage premium for the high-wage self-employed in Argentina, ultimately
26 Arango and Maloney (1999).
13vanishing in Costa Rica, but less so in Brazil.  This is consistent with the view of self-
employment as comprising two tiers of workers, a significant fraction earning very low
wages and a smaller proportion of workers who are better off.  Wages are less dispersed
among unprotected workers in small firms and uniformly smaller than wages in other
sectors.  Thus  the  growing group of self-employed tends  to  exacerbate  overall wage
inequality in these countries.  The informal/formal salaried wage differential is higher in
Brazil, especially at the upper tail, and rather similar in Argentina and Costa Rica where it
is higher at both tails.
Average real wages increased in the three countries, especially in Brazil (3.4%),
and less in Costa Rica (1.1%), mainly reflecting substantial wage increases for informal
salaried workers.  However, wage growth was far from uniform both within and between
countries.
In Argentina, formal salaried average wages increased the least (1.5% per year),
due to sluggish wage gains of workers earning above the median formal sector wage.  In
contrast, real  wages rose only for workers at the upper tail of the self-employed wage
distribution while those in the bottom decile experienced a wage decline or stagnation.
The big  wage gains of informal salaried workers (avg. 3.9% per year) were somewhat
homogeneous  so that  their whole wage distribution  shifted to  the right, except for  a
sluggish increase at the bottom tail.
In Brazil, the self-employed experienced the smallest average wage gains (2.3%
per  year),  mainly  reflecting  small real  wage changes  at the  upper  quartile.  Unlike
Argentina, those self-employed earning below the self-employed median wage did fairly
well.  Workers at the upper tail of the formal salaried wage distribution also benefited
relatively less.  The considerable wage gains of the informal salaried (6.6% per year) were
also the biggest at the bottom tail.
In Costa Rica, the average wage gains of informal salaried workers were much
more modest (1.8% per year), and similar among formal salaried and cuenta propistas.
Unlike Argentina and Brazil, real wage growth was highest at the tails in all three sectors,
with the self-employed located in the two middle quartiles even experiencing a decline or
stagnation in wages.
In sum,  not  all  workers have benefited from  the  wage  bonanza  in  the  three
countries, nor have wage gains been uniform. However, usual segmented markets stories
are not the key.  Many workers in informal jobs, the usual suspected losers, are among
those who benefit most.  In all three countries, the infornal  salaried cut the gap with
respect to the formal salaried, especially at the upper tail in Argentina and in both tails in
Brazil and Costa Rica.  The less well off self-employed in Brazil did fairly well, although
still lagged behind their analogous formal salaried.  Similarly, while the better off self-
employed in Argentina and Costa Rica outperformed their formal salaried counterparts,
those less well off continued to lag fairly far behind.
4.3.2  Group-Specific Wage Growth Patterns
Figures 2-4 depict, for each country and each year, wage densities for different
groups of workers according to age, education and occupational skill.  Further contrasting
14patterns  of  real  wage  changes emerge  across  countries.  In  only  a  few  cases  can
unambiguous conclusions (uniform shifts) be drawn about the wage performance of any
given group within a country.
Although the densities for all age groups generally shifted to the right, except in
Costa Rica, the wage bonanza was stronger among young and older workers in Argentina
and Brazil.  In Costa Rica, the distributions for young and middle-age workers changed
little, and that of older workers shows wage improvements at the tails but a slight wage
compression at the middle.  Across education groups, Argentine and Brazilian workers
with  primary  education show the  more substantial  and  generalized  real  wage  gains,
followed by those with secondary.  As a whole, the less educated Costa Rican mostly
experienced small wage declines.  Meanwhile, the wage performance of workers with
higher  education  is  mixed.  While  in  Argentina  and  Costa  Rica the  more  educated
appeared to gain at the tails, the distribution compressed in the middle.  No discernible
change occurred in Brazil.  Finally, all three distributions for occupation groups shifted
rightward in  Argentina and Brazil, but more so for blue collar workers in Brazil  and
professionals at the upper tail in Argentina.  In Costa Rica, wages declined considerably
for workers in the middle of the white collar distribution, barely changed for blue collar,
and rose for the better-off professionals.  Overall, these distribution trends are consistent
with the rise in manufacturing productivity and the good performance of the informal
salaried  in  Argentina  and  Brazil,  the  curb  in  public  expenditure  and  white  collar
employment and the increasing skill orientation of the maquila-led growth in Costa Rica.
Further conditioning on both education and age readily reveals particular groups
that have not benefited from the apparent overall wage bonanza.  Table 4 (panels a-b)
presents the yearly change in median and mean real wages for nine age-education (skill)
groups.  Rather than pinpointing a common story, the patterns vary widely both across
and within countries, and hint at considerable variance in wage growth experiences.
Focusing  on  median wages, the  big  losers  in  Argentina were  formal  salaried
middle  age workers with higher education, followed by self-employed young workers
with primary or less and the middle age with some or complete secondary.  As indicated
above,  young  informal  salaried workers with  primary or  less  were  the  big  winners.
Moreover,  informal young  and  older workers with  secondary education  substantially
outperformed the like in formal sector jobs, and similarly for better educated workers in
informal jobs, albeit the sample sizes are small.
As suggested before, unexpectedly, the wage bonanza in Brazil eluded workers
with  higher  eclucation almost  altogether.  Among  these,  the  young  self-employed
experienced the sharpest median wage decline, followed by older workers in  informal
salaried jobs and the formal salaried young.  In fact, among the better educated only older
formal  salaried, and  self-employed workers accrued  significant real  wage  gains.  In
contrast, the inipressive growth of wages of the less educated spilled over all workers
regardless of age and sector of employment, although it was more pronounced among the
informal salaried.
15The  results  for  Costa  Rica  indicate  that  the  ambiguous  distribution  shifts
discussed earlier mask mixed patterns of wage performance.  The bulk of median wage
gains have been markedly concentrated so that instances of real wage deterioration are
more  common.  The hardest hit  were older workers with  secondary education  in  all
sectors,  middle  age self-employed with  primary or  less and  the young with  some  or
complete  secondary in informal jobs.  Like in Argentina, median  real wage  gains  of
formal salaried workers with higher education were notable for the young and minor for
the  middle  age.  Moreover,  the  strong wage  growth of  older informal  workers with
primary or less contrasts with the wage stagnation of the like formal salaried. 27
Overall, the picture revealed by this simple wage cell analysis fails to  conform
with  the common  presumption that economic reforms have resulted  in wide  regional
trends of steadily rising real wages for highly educated workers in formal salaried jobs,
and  sluggish  or  even declining wages  for  the  less educated,  especially those  in  the
informal sector.  The evidence from Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica suggests that more
intricate patterns of wage growth are at play, which often position disadvantaged workers
at the front line of  wage gains.  Among Workers with higher education, only the old
formal and self-employed did consistently better across all countries.  These are likely to
be  managers  or  workers  with  long  tenures  and  specific  human  capital  such  as
organizational knowledge that remains valuable in restructuring economies.
It is interesting to note that often both the magnitudes and patterns of wage growth
are significantly modified when wage outcomes are assessed based on average (Table 4B)
rather than median  wages. This  is particularly the case in  Costa Rica  and  Argentina.
Rather than being driven by outliers 28 or small cell samples, this points to considerable
heterogeneity  in  wage  growth  within  many  age-education  groups  and  sectors.  As
indicated by the shifts in the group-specific wage distributions, real wage changes were
often  far  from  homogeneous.  More  generally,  differences  in  the  distribution  of
unobservable factors such as individual spunk or school quality are also likely to affect
differently the wage performance of observationally equivalent workers  so that single
measures like the mean or the median would be inappropriate to fully characterize wage
performance.
In a spirit similar to the above wage density comparisons, we would also like to
explore  whether existing  wage  differentials within  "counterfactual"  narrowly  defined
groups have changed any differently over the time period.  Obviously, we face severe data
limitations to control for even some of the possible interrelations by partitioning workers
into many different groups for which  wage densities (or even average  wages) can be
estimated.  Quantile regressions provide us with a powerful tool to come close to such
characterization by revealing the relative wage perfornance  of more narrowly defined
"archetypical" workers.  The results of this multivariate quantile analysis below indeed
pinpoint  important differences in the wage  growth experiences of workers at different
points of the conditional wage distribution.
27 Results  for  the more  educated  workers  in informal  jobs suggest  notorious  wage deterioration  but are
unreliable  due to their small  number.
28 Means are computed  after  trimming  3% of the observations  in the tails within  each group.
165.  Wage Quantile  Regression  Results
Table 5 presents the change over time in the adjusted wage differentials obtained
from the quantile analysis for the age-education specification for each country.29 The raw
estimated coefficients  (with  p-values) used in  these computations together  with  mean
(OLS) estimates are in Appendix III.
Two  remarks  can  help  interpretation  of  the  findings.  First,  each  quantile
coefficient has the usual regression interpretation.  It measures the difference in the log
wages  between  a  worker  with  the  particular  characteristic  and  an  otherwise  similar
worker with the excluded category.  For instance, the coefficient on complete secondary
education measures  the  log wage  differential between a  worker with  completed  high
school and an otherwise similar worker with completed college or more.  The anti-log of
the coefficient gives the relative wage gap of high school workers with respect to college,
adjusting for everything else. 30
Second, we can think of the different quantiles as pertaining to different "types" of
workers located in various points of the distribution of wages for a (counterfactual) group
sharing similar characteristics.  Thus, the 10t"  quantile coefficient on complete secondary
roughly measures the difference between the corresponding 10th wage percentiles of the
secondary and the college groups, adjusting for other factors.  Similarly, the 90th quantile
coefficient  measures the difference between the 90th (conditional) wage  percentiles of
each education group.  The low quantiles can be thought of as pertaining to workers in
jobs  earning  wages  lower  than  granted by  their  attained  education  level  and  other
measured characteristics, and the high quantiles to workers in "privileged jobs",  that is,
those  earning  wages higher  than predicted by observable  characteristics.  Again,  the
positioning  of  workers across different conditional quantiles  is more likely  related to
unobservable  heterogeneity  such  as  differences  in  ability,  family  labor  market
connections andl/or quality of schooling that varies across groups of workers rather than
reflecting merely luck.
Although the precise magnitude of differentials obviously refers to the base group,
conclusions about relative wage performance obtained from between group comparisons
of changes in estimated wage differentials are clearly independent of the choices of base
categories. 31 The discussion of the results is organized by broad worker characteristics
but it is important to stress that they pertain to a conditional analysis where confounding
wage effects of the various worker characteristics have been isolated.
29 Due to sample  size considerations,  in this  specification  we do not distinguish  between  completion  or not
of each level of education.  The results  for the other  specification  are fairly  consistent  and  thus reassure  that
the fndings are not biased  by small  education-age  cell sizes.
30 Letting  b denote  the corresponding  regression  coefficient,  we have  that exp(-b)-l yields the "return"  to
college  education  (Kennedy,  1981). Although  the required  conditions  are rather strong,  it is customary  to
interpret  coefficients  on log wage  regressions  as measures  of returns  to education.
31 Our choice  of base  group  seeks  direct identification  of wage differentials  pertaining  to workers  who, due
to their human  capital  endowvment  or other  characteristics,  are more likely  to be sensitively  affected  by
economic  shocks. The wages  of workers  in the base categories  are also likely  to be relatively  more  stable
over  time.
17Age-Education
Adjusting  for  industry,  occupation,  sector  of  employment,  and  other
demographics, on average, wage growth has still lagged behind for middle age workers
with higher or secondary education in Argentina, the young and middle age with higher
education  and  older  workers with  secondary  in  Brazil,  and  for  older  workers  with
secondary, middle age with  college or more and the young with primary education in
Costa Rica.  The best average wage performers continued to. be the young with college or
more  and all  workers with primary education (especially the young) in  Argentina, all
workers with primary education (especially the old) and the young with  secondary in
Brazil, the young with higher education and older and middle age workers with primary
in Costa Rica.  However, the changes in wage quantile differentials indicate that wage
growth was far from uniform even within these narrowly defined groups.
In Costa  Rica and to  a lesser  extent  in Argentina, most  of the  positive  wage
performance  is  mainly  concentrated at  the  higher  quantiles  of  the  conditional  wage
distribution.  Adjusting for other factors, the less educated Costa Rican workers (of all
ages) lagged notoriously behind at the lower quantiles while similar workers matched or
often outperformed the more educated at the high quantiles. Similarly, the high relative
wage  growth  of the  young and  middle  age with  higher  education mostly reflect  the
superior progress of those at the high quantiles.  In Argentina, other factors considered,
wage growth was considerably sluggish for the  10th quantile of young and middle  age
workers  with  primary  schooling and  the  more educated young,  precisely  the  groups
whose median wage experienced the highest growth.
Interestingly, in  Brazil we  generally find the  reverse patterns.  Except  for the
young with primary, the bulk of wage growth among the less educated is mainly accrued
by workers in the lower quantiles.  In fact, the relative wage gains of middle age and older
workers with secondary education escaped those at the upper quartile (75th quantile and
above)  of  the  conditional  wage  distribution.  However,  the  relatively  weak  wage
performance of young and  middle age workers with  higher education  is less  marked
among those in the more privileged jobs  (i.e., at or above the 90th quantile, adjusting for
other factors).
In  short,  while wage  bonanza  in  Argentina  and  Costa  Rica  generally eluded
workers at the lowest quantiles (in the less privileged jobs, conditionally), in Brazil these
tend to benefit the most.
Occupation and Tenure
Even adjusting for education and other factors, professionals continued to expand
their wage advantage over workers in unskilled (agriculture,  blue collar) and relatively
skilled (white collar, managers) occupations by an average of roughly 2% per year in
Argentina and Costa Rica, but do not show any apparent average wage growth advantage
in Brazil. 32
32 Although  occupational  categories  differ somewhat  across  countries,  these  are still  broadly  comparable.
18However, the quantile results again indicate that this masks important differences
in wage growth experiences within occupational groups.  Other factors considered, both
skilled and unskilled workers did relatively worse at the lower than at the upper quantiles
in  Argentina.  The opposite pattern is  observed in  Costa  Rica where  wages  of non-
professionals, especially those in white collar jobs, lagged noticeably behind at the higher
quantiles.  This may be related to the constraints on public expenditure and employment
growth imposed by fiscal rigidities. 33 Non-professionals at the bottom quartile as well as
the unskilled in the upper decile fell relatively behind in Brazil.
Further interesting insights are obtained in Argentina, where data on tenure in the
occupation are available.  Wages of new workers (less than 1 year) lagged considerably
behind those  of other workers, especially at the low quantiles. This could be associated
with the  downward pressure of high unemployment rates on  wages for new  entrants.
Workers  with  some  experience  (1-5)  did  considerably  better  than  those  with  more
seniority in their occupation (5-10 and more than 10, respectively).  As a result there was
a surge of substantial wage premiums for new workers already located in more steady
jobs over new entrants, especially at the bottom quantiles.  This may be indicative of the
instability  of  starting  salaries  of  new  entrants  during  economic  transitions.  It  also
suggests that adjusting for education, age and other factors, human capital accumulation
acquired  through  labor  market  experience  is  proportionally  more  compensatory  of
differentials in starting salaries of workers in less privileged jobs.
Thus, the rising wage advantage entailed by specific human capital, particularly
for professionals,  was generally more visible  at the lower  quantiles  in  Argentina  and
Brazil and at the higher quantiles in Costa Rica.  The Argentine evidence further suggests
that for any occutpational  skill level, the premium to human capital accumulated through
on-the-job training  appears highest for workers that  are relatively new in  their current
occupation, especially those at the lower quantiles.
Sector
Adjusting for human capital and other worker characteristics cut in half (roughly)
the raw informal/formal (IS/FS) average wage differentials in all three countries (in Table
3), while, interestingly, in Brazil the adjusted self-employment/formal (SE/FS) wage gap
reveals a significant wage premium for cuenta propistas.  Early in each period the IS/FS
wage gap shrinks monotonically towards higher quantiles, ranging from -29% to -12% in
Argentina, -47%/'o  to  -22% in  Brazil, and -47% to -13% in  Costa  Rica.  Similarly, the
SE/FS adjusted wage differentials range from -33% to 18% in Argentina, -15% to 40% in
Brazil, -42% to 27% in Costa Rica.  Thus, as with raw sectoral wage differentials, the
adjusted quantile differentials conform to two tiers of informality.  The lower seemingly
consists of workers with a sizable wage disadvantage, and the upper comprises those with
more dynamic earnings, often much higher than formal earnings.
33 The proportion  of white collar  workers  employed  in the public  sector declined  from 59% to 50% during
the period.
19Adjusting  for other factors, the  self-employed did  relatively worse in all  three
countries,  specifically those below the third quartile in Argentina and  Costa Rica  and
about all the same in Brazil.  The apparent wage advantage of the self-employed changed
very little at the top quartile in Argentina and Costa Rica.  Meanwhile, the superior wage
gains of the informal salaried encountered earlier, appear widely spread only in Brazil and
pertain to those  in the upper quantile informal jobs  in Argentina and Costa Rica.  Thus
conditional analysis again reveals sluggish wage growth at the lower quantiles among the
best (average) wage performers, in this case the informal salaried.
It is then clear that once we adjust for usual wage determinants, self-employed
workers in the (conditionally) disadvantaged jobs have lagged systematically behind their
salaried worker counterparts.  Except for Brazil, those in the more privileged jobs,  as
judged  by  their  measured  characteristics,  have  maintained  their  wage  advantage.
Meanwhile,  it  appears that  the soaring rates of  entrance into self-employment  in  the
Brazilian  labor market (for both men and women) during the period have constricted
shifts of the entire self-employed wage distribution.
Industry
Some sizable wage differentials arise between workers in different industries that
are unexplained  by human capital and  other worker  characteristics. With the notable
exception of Brazil, most of these wage differentials become muted by the end  of the
period.
In Argentina, on average, wages in all sectors but retail grew faster than in the
control financial/business services sector.  Wages soared in construction, social services
and public administration/defense so as to become more closely aligned.  In the remaining
sectors wage growth has been relatively weak in the middle quantiles.  Thus, adjusting for
worker  characteristics,  workers employed  in  manufacturing  and  some  non-tradables
(retail,  personal  services,  communication/transportation/public  utilities)  did  relatively
worse or show no advantageous wage improvements at these quantiles.  Other factors
considered, wages remained the lowest for those employed in retail and personal services.
In  Brazil,  average  wage  differentials  declined  across  all  sectors,  except  for
transportation/communication/public  utilities. 34 Wages  rose  relatively  faster  in  some
non-tradables (social services, construction, public administration/defense, and personal
services).  However, except for construction workers, this wage growth is systematically
accrued by workers in the upper quantiles.  Generally, workers in the bottom quartile did
relatively worse  or show no advantageous wage growth,  including those  employed  in
manufacturing.  Although  wages became relatively more homogeneous across sectors,
they  remained  significantly  lower  for  workers  in  retail  and  personal  services  and
continued to be higher in transportation/communication/public utilities and the financial
sector despite their slow growth.
3  Inter-industrial  wage differentials  are considerably  higher in Brazil. However,  this is mostly
due to the difference  in base category. The latter  consists only of workers  in financial  services
since  we were able to separate  these from  services  to businesses  (serv2).
20In Costa  Rica, wage differentials across industries are significantly smaller and
also become more muted by the end of the period.  Public employees enjoy wage rents
over all other workers.  However, it should be noted that, unlike Argentina and Brazil, the
definition is not restricted to public administration and defense but more generally refer to
the broad public; sector. 35 Public employees and retail workers did relatively worse, with
the average wage premium of the former shrinking in almost half. Again, workers in the
non-tradables sectors of construction and in social and personal services show the fastest
average wage improvement. Much like in Brazil, wage growth in all sectors often eluded
workers  at  the  bottom  quartile  of  the  conditional  wage  distribution.  In  fact,  public
employees at the upper quartile experienced only a slight decline in their wage premium.
Summarizing, we found that in all three countries wages of retail workers have
generally lagged behind. Manufacturing wages are not among the fastest growing. Often
disadvantaged  sectors (particularly, construction and  social services) have experienced
the fastest wage  growth. Although this  led to  a general decline in  inter-industry wage
rents, especially in the tradable sectors, this was less so in Brazil. Workers in retail and
personal services continued to earn significantly lower wages. Strikingly, the dynamics
generating wage  gains in the expanding sectors have not been homogeneous and often
elude workers in the less privileged jobs, conditional on measured worker characteristics.
Regional  and Demographics
In  most  cases,  cross  country  comparisons of  wage  differentials  arising  from
demographic and regional variation are not possible due to data unavailability. Thus, the
race of individuals was only available in Brazil, marital status was not  available in the
1989 Brazilian survey, and we can only account for regional differences in  Brazil and
Costa Rica where by survey design a somewhat wider national representation is granted.
In all liree  countries, controlling for other factors, married male workers enjoy a
wage premium over single workers, which except for Brazil is often higher at the lower
quantiles. This rose to roughly  11-13 percent in Argentina and Costa Rica, reflecting an
increase  in  the  first  decile in  Argentina  and  in  both  tails  for  Costa  Rica.  Although
unavailable for  1989, it stood slightly higher in  Brazil (18%). There are no significant
differences in wages of single workers and those in a consensual union, except for a small
premium in Brazil. Heads of non-single headed households did relatively worse than non-
heads. While the former enjoyed a wage premium  similar to that  of married workers, 36
this declined consistently in all three countries, especially in Argentina.
The faster growth  of wages  of  married male  workers contrasts  with  the well
documented decline in the married wage premitmi in the U.S. There, this has been found
to be largely due to a decline in the male productivity effects associated with marriage
35  The Costa  Rican  survey  asks workers  explicitly  whether  they work  in the private  or public  sector. Thus,
the public  sector  dummy  should  presumably  include  workers  ir the decentralized  enterprises  and Central
Bank workers  who often  earn higher  wages. The lower  inter-industry  wage  differentials  compared  to the
other  countries  may  then be due to the purging  of public  wage effects  across  all economic  sectors.
36 Presumably,  as in the case  of married  workers,  the wage  premium  for heads  also reflects  a return to
unobserved  worker  characteristics  which  grant  higher  wages.
21that followed from a reduction in the average degree of specialization across households
as women entered the labor force (Korenman and Neumark, 1991).  As reported in Table
1, available data in Costa Rica and Argentina indicate a change in the patterns of family
formation, with marriages in relative decline and consensual unions becoming relatively
more common.  Thus, the rising wage premium for married males may reflect a return to
the value of marriage as a sign of personal attributes such as stability and commitment.
In Brazil, black and mulatto workers earn wages substantially lower than granted
by measured  characteristics (on average, 20 to  25% less than whites  in  1989) while,
despite their small number, those with Asian ethnicity enjoy a huge wage premium (an
average 28% more than whites in 1989).  The wage disadvantage of black and mulatto
workers tends to be higher at the upper quantiles.  Over the period, average wages grew
relatively  more  for  non-whites,  other  factors  considered.  However,  progress  was
generally rather weak for blacks and stronger only at the upper quantiles for mulatos.  By
1995, on average, blacks and mulatos were still earning wages 22% and 15% lower than
whites, respectively.  Asians expanded their wage advantage substantially, especially at
high quantiles.
Significant regional differences in wages emerge between the more developed and
the less developed regions.  Early in the period, workers living in the urban centers of the
poorest region in Brazil (northeast) earned on average 24% less than those in the richest
region (southeast).  Similarly, in  Costa Rica average wages of workers in the poorest
regions (Chorotega and Brunca) were 13% lower than in the most developed region (i.e.,
San Jose).  Over the period, this wage disadvantage continued to expand to other regions,
more or less uniformly in Brazil and especially at the lower quantiles in Costa Rica.
In summary, although based on partial evidence, the picture that emerges from the
above  patterns  of  wage  growth  is  not  very  auspicious  for  workers  facing  wage
disadvantages  not  explained by human capital or job  attributes.  Adjusting  for  other
factors, although wages of married workers grew faster, those of heads did not.  Since the
tendency towards a higher frequency of consensual unions may be more accentuated in
poorer  households, workers  in  the  latter may have benefited  less  from  overall  wage
growth.  Moreover, the relative wage progress of disadvantaged groups such as black and
mulatto workers has been slim, especially for those in the (conditionally) less privileged
jobs.  Wage differentials that cannot be explained by human capital and other worker and
job  attributes remain  significant.  Finally, workers in the less developed  regions have
benefited less from overall wage growth, especially those who already rank  low in the
conditional wage distribution.
6.  Conclusions  and Policy  Implications
Our findings provide rich empirical evidence to address the three main questions
we  aimed  to  examine.  We  find  that  the  well  known  regional  trends  of  rising
unemployment but  better  employment quality, as measured by rising  real wages, hide
patterns of intra-male economic marginalization with varying country intensity, some of
which operate rather subtly and thus require finer methodological  scrutiny.  These are
summarized and discussed below.
22With regard  to unemployment, although the young are delaying their entry into the
labor market, the slow speed of net job creation has affected them the most, especially the
less  educated,  even  in  countries like  Costa Rica  where unemployment has  remained
remarkably  low,  In  all  three  countries,  they  are  generally  twice  as  likely  to  be
unemployed, and remain jobless for increasingly longer periods in Argentina and Costa
Rica.  Furthermore, unemployed older workers and those with higher education continued
to have greater  difficulties in being re-employed.  The slow speed of creation of high
quality jobs  for the rapidly expanding group of workers with higher education and their
longer unemployment episodes is worrisome.  Not only does it imply that a great deal of
skill potential is underutilized, but it may also lead younger workers to question the value
of a college education as a means of social mobility.
The findings from the (conditional) wage analysis allow us to construct archetypal
male  groups  who  have  experienced real  wage  losses  or  at  best  lagged  behind.  In
Argentina:  middle  age workers with higher education or secondary, non-professionals
(especially  the  blue  collar),  new  entrants  and  those  with  longer  tenure  in  their
occupations, household heads, and the self-employed in retail and personal services.  In
Brazil:  the  young  and  middle  age  with  higher  education  and  older  workers  with
secondary,  non-whites,  household  heads,  self-employed,  in  transportation,
communication and utilities, and living in the less developed metropolitan regions.  In
Costa Rica: older workers with secondary and the young with primary education, non-
professionals  (especially  the  white  collar),  self-employed,  retail  and  public  sector
workers, and those living in the less developed urban areas.  Thus, some general patterns
emerge for some non-human capital characteristics while the human capital (education)
variables are not so clear cut.
The best average wage performers continued to be the young with college or more
and all workers with primary education (especially the young) in Argentina, workers with
primary education (especially the old) and the young with secondary in Brazil, the young
with higher education and older and middle age workers with primary in Costa Rica.  In
addition, wage growth has been greater for those who are professionals, those employed
in  construction  and  social  services,  and  new  workers  with  some  experience  (in
Argentina).
Although  we have not  attempted to  establish  causal connections,  the above  wage
growth  patterns  are  only  partially  consistent  with  expected  reform  outcomes.  The
predictions of standard Hecksher-Ohlin trade theory are consistent with the stronger wage
gains of the less educated in Brazil and Argentina, but not with the poor performance of
some  of  the  less  educated  Costa  Ricans.  Moreover,  workers  in  non-tradables  often
experience the most wage gains.  Similarly, the evidence contradicts the existence of a
systematic  skill  bias  in  labor demand  due  to  technical  change.  Although  wages  of
professionals tend to  grow faster than those of unskilled workers, the patterns  do not
easily break down along educational lines, e.g., the young reaped most of the gains of the
college educated workers in Argentina and Costa Rica.  Whether or not the cross-country
differences  relate  to  the  scope,  phasing  and  speed  of  the  reform  process  in  these
economies deserves further exploration.
23Thus, our  results support the agnosticism with respect to the conventional wisdom
linking  rising  wage  inequality with  economic reforms  (particularly,  liberalization)  in
Latin America. 37 Overall, the evidence is still inconclusive and may be highly sensitive
to the trends.  In countries where there is evidence of a worsening of inequality during the
period of reforms, it is still unclear whether this is a persistent or transitory phenomenon
and what the causes are across the spectrum of countries.
Moreover, the usual stories of wage marginalization of vulnerable (e.g., less educated,
young) workers or simplistic segmented market stories are generally at odds with the
observed variety of wage growth patterns in the three countries.  Our findings conform to
two tiers of informality.  The lower seemingly consists of workers with  a sizable wage
disadvantage, and the upper comprises those with more dynamic earnings, often much
higher than formal earnings.  Although the disadvantaged self-employed do appear to lag
behind, often the less educated workers and those in informal salaried jobs appear at the
front line of wage gains.  The flow of workers to informal salaried jobs, particularly those
who  end  up in  the lower wage  informal jobs,  may be viewed as  consistent  with  the
relatively better prospects of wage growth in the sector.
The results also uncover the stringent limitations of the standard mean wage analysis.
A novel and striking finding is that in Argentina and Costa Rica most  of the positive
wage performance is mainly concentrated at the higher quantiles of the conditional wage
distribution.  Very often, the dynamics generating wage gains for workers from particular
groups or in the expanding sectors have eluded workers in the less privileged jobs, that is,
those earning wages lower than granted by observable characteristics.  This suggests that
differences  in  unobservable  worker  characteristics such as  labor market  connections,
school quality or industriousness are key determinants of variations in wage performance
among workers with the same measured human capital and job  attributes.  For instance,
the rising real wages for the less educated young Argentine workers may have persisted
despite the  high  and persistent  unemployment that afflicts  their  less  fortunate  equals
because jobs in the upper quantiles are hardly accessible to the unemployed so that the
downward pressure on wages of redundant labor operate only  in the  lower quantiles.
Although challenging, this is a matter that deserves further exploration.
Our findings call for policy initiatives on different fronts.  A revamp of social
protection schemes in the region is of utmost priority.  To the extent that younger
unemployed workers are generally household members and benefit from other family
income sources, 38 they may not warrant the special attention of anti-poverty safety nets.
Similarly, workers with higher education tend to have access to more mechanisms to
smooth unemployment transitions (i.e., savings, credit and assets).  However, the increase
37 Other studies have found evidence of rising wage inequality (e.g., the returns to education becoming
steeper) in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela for different time periods (see, for example, the studies
by Ferreira and Paes de Barros (1999) in Brazil, Velez, Kugler and Bouillon (1999) in Colombia, Bouillon,
Legovini and Lustig (1999) and Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) in Mexico, and Ruprah (1999) in Venezuela.)
However, also using data on male workers (excluding the self-employed) in Chile, Montenegro (1999)
found that after 1990 wage inequality started to decline.
38 Less than 20% of those age 15-25 are non-single household heads, compared to more than half of the
middle age, and the vast majority of older workers.
24in the rates of participation of the old may indicate their need to provide or supplement
household income with prolonged work.  Thus, it may be more effective to target well-
designed unemployment insurance programs mostly to the less educated elderly, to
cushion and reduce their longer unemployment spells, and to those of middle age despite
their less severe umemployment  situation. 39 Furthermore, the large contribution of
informality to the soaring unemployment in Argentina warns that the concerns of massive
layoffs resulting from productive restructuring and public sector retrenchment may have
left too little attention to the situation of unprotected workers that lose their jobs in small
firms wiped out by incoming national or transnational firms operating on a larger more
efficient scale.  T  his stresses the well recognized need to find creative mechanisms to
extend safety nets to these workers.
Perhaps too much emphasis has been put on disparities in access to education as the
main  culprit  in  the  rise  in  wage  inequality in  some  countries.  Rising  returns  for
professionals could reflect the scarcity of managers and other workers with specific skills
to enact changes during periods of economic transformation.  This calls for initiatives to
give access to  the poor to high quality education and training  in specific skills.  More
importantly, our quantile results strongly suggest that an increase in within-group wage
inequality  may  have  been  an  important contributor  to  any  observed  rise  in  overall
inequality. 40 If part of the quantile difference in wage premiums is due to discriminatory
practices or  location-specific advantages, other policies are warranted.  Discriminatory
practices may require changes in existing labor legislation and its application.  If access to
high  quality jobs  is  determined by  information asymmetries (e.g.,  due  to  geographic
closeness),  then a greater effort at disseminating information on available employment
opportunities  could contribute to more equal access to better jobs  among workers from
different  socioeconomic  statuses.  Furthermore,  the  finding  of  swiftly  rising  wage
premiums for new Argentine workers already located in more steady jobs  over workers
just  entering new occupations (especially at the bottom quantiles) may be indicative of
the instability  of  starting  salaries of new  entrants during  economic  transitions.  Re-
employment programs targeted to new workers, especially those who tend to  have the
lowest starting salaries, may offer a very cost-effective means to reduce wage disparities
and smooth employment transitions.
Continuing  economic restructuring  may affect  the  income  generation potential  of
males and result in more subtle negative impacts on social outcomes and perceptions that
should  not  be  ignored.  Increasing and persistent  unemployment  and  barriers to  high
quality employrnent have likely affected the capacity of some young men and displaced
older  workers to  effect  a  "breadwinner" role in  their  current  or  prospective  families
(Barker,  1998).  The potential link to increasing violence and criminality in the region
calls for policy interventions such as progressive programs that help these and older men
39 This is not to say that  the young  should  be excluded  from such programs. Efficient  considerations  may
still dictate  warranting  some coverage  (e.g., of household  heads)  to moderate  risk averse  behavior  and
improve  job matching.
40 The results  of Montenegro  (1999) also  indicate  that  increasing  earnings  disparities  in  the eighties  may
have  been in part associated  with  a large increase  in the return  to education  of workers  at the higher
quantiles  of the (conditional)  wage distribution,  and to increasing  wage dispersion  in white collar  jobs
compared  to blue collar (controlling  for education  and experience).
25reflect "about  what  it means to  be men"  and find new ways to reaffirm their roles  as
fathers and partners (Barker, 1998). These may include public support to counseling and
mentoring  community  services  and  to  the  creation  of  spaces  for  discussions  about
fatherhood and domestic violence in community organizations.
26TABLE 1: Male Labor Force Participation and Unemployment
ARGENTINA  BRAZIL  COSTA RICA
A. Labor Force Participation Rates (%)
1988  1997  1989  1995  1989  1995
15Sage<20  42.9  37.1  67.4  63.4  46.8  47.2
20Sage<25  86.1  88.6  90.2  88.2  80.9  84.2
25Sage<45  96.8  97.3  95.6  94.7  96.6  96.2
45SageS70  74.5  79.2  70.2  71.6  78.2  79.2
primary  82.1  84.1  81.8  80.0  84.5  84.6
secondary  76.2  75.3  86.2  86.1  79.1  78.4
university  80.6  82.3  90.1  86.7  79.6  84.0
Overall  80.6  81.3  84.6  83.7  81.6  82.0
A. Sectoral Participation Rates (%)
formal  68.0  63.0  65.0  57.0  71.0  70.0
informal  12.0  15.0  16.0  17.0  10.0  11.0
self-emp.  20.0  22.0  19.0  26.0  19.0  19.0
C. Unemployment Rates (%)
1988  1997  1989  1995  1989  1995
15sage<25  11.:2  23.6  8.2  14.6  9.4  12.4
25sage<45  4.1  10.1  3.9  6.9  3.0  3.5
45SageS70  3.9  11.4  2.0  4.9  2.3  3.4
primary  6.9  17.7  4.5  7.2  5.2  7.0
secondary  4.8  11.9  5.6  8.5  4.7  5.8
university  2.1  8.0  1.3  3.7  1.6  3.3
formal  4.0)  8.8  4.4  8.4  4.8  6.0
informal  6.1  18.3  6.8  2.6  11.7  10.0
self-emp.  7.4  18.0  1.7  2.4  2.1  2.5
Overall  5.4  13.4  4.7  7.6  4.5  5.8
D. Unemployment Duration
% unemployed
Average no. of  Weeks  > 8 weeks
1988  1997  1989  1995  1989  1995
15sage<25  9  19.3  14.3  9.1  51.7  60.2
25Sage<45  9.8  17.7  13.8  11.9  42.5  49.2
45Sages70  14.5  24.8  15.8  19.3  75.0  75.0
primary  11.1  18.6  12.6  12.5  47.6  55.6
secondary  9.4  18  15.0  11.0  55.6  63.5
university  11.3  33.7  21.0  13.8  50.0  65.0
formal  10.6  24.0  14.2  9.7  31.5  42.8
informal  6.4  16.6  12.0  8.9  32.3  32.5
self-emp.  12.5  12.9  11.0  10.0  30.0  26.7
Overall  10.6  20.3  14.1  11.7  50.9  59.6
27TABLE 2: Characteristics of the Male Work Force (Proportions)
A rm-ntin  ArnA]  Cnetp  Rien
19RX  1997  19R9  1995  19R9  1995
FS  IS  SE  FS  IS  SE]  FS  IS  SE  FS  IS  SE  [FS  IS  SE IFS  IS  SEj
primal  0.07 0.24 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.05  0.1  0.28 0.06 0.1  0.24 0.04
prima2  0.23 0.21 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.27 0.17 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.27 0.17 0.25 0.23
prima3  0.18 0.15 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.11 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.11 0.14 0.29 0.1  0.11 0.27
secunl  0.09 0.17 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.05 0.20 0.25 0.07 0.16 0.27 0.07 0.13 0.17 0.03 0.12 0.16 0.04
secun2  0.19 0.11 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.27 0.14 0.23 0.32 0.19 0.27 0.24 0.13 0.19 0.24 0.14 0.2
secun3  0.08 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.11
univI  0.03  0.04  0.01 0.05 0.04  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.02 0.01  0.04  0.03  0
univ2  0.10 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.15 0.04 0.08
univ3  0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02  0  0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
manuf  0.39 0.21 0.13 0.32 0.18 0.11 0.31 0.18 0.06 0.28 0.18 0.05 0.23 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.12 0.12
const  0.06 0.21 0.25 0.04 0.21 0.23 0.09 0.25 0.21 0.08 0.24 0.24 0.08 0.21 0.16 0.06 0.21 0.16
servl  0.12 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.12
retail  0.14 0.29 0.27 0.15 0.26 0.25 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.13 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.26 0.31 0.18 0.22 0.24
serv2  0.08 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.06
socia  0.07 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.28 0.03 0.02 0.23 0.05 0.03
other  0.04 0.13 0.16 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.25 0.27 0.12 0.21 0.26 0.10 0.27 0.24 0.11 0.26 0.26
public  0.10  0.01 0.01  0.11 0.00  0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.3  0.00 0.00
head  0.68 0.46 0.78 0.62 0.44 0.70 0.63 0.41 0.76 0.66 0.44 0.75 0.65 0.39 0.78 0.62 0.41 0.74
white  - - - - - - 0.57 0,46 0.55 0.56 0.45 0.54  - - - - - -
black  - - - - - - 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06  - - - - - -
mulato  - - - - - - 0.36 0.45 0.38 0.36 0.47  0.39  - - - - - -
asian  - - - - - - 0.01  0.00 0.01  0.00 0.00  0.01  - - - - - -
skilled  0.25 0.43 0.21 0.17 0.33 0.22 0.73 0.91 0.93 0.74 0.90 0.93 0.61 0.82 0.77 0.59 0.77 0.76
unskilled 0.67 0.56 0.73 0.76 0.66 0.70 0.19 0.05 0.00 0.18 0.06 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.01
profes  0.09  0.01 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.03 0.10 0.22 0.06 0.12
agric  - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.05  0.12 0.13 0.04 0.14 0.11
regl  - - - - - - 0.63 0.53 0.54 0.63 0.51 0.55 0.36 0.21 0.35  0.44 0.31 0.44
reg2  - - - - - - 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.27  0.24 0.22 0.22 0.19
reg3  - - - - - - 0.25 0.39 0.35 0.26 0.39 0.35 0.13 0.25 0.17 0.11 0.20 0.16
reg4  - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.16 0.13  0.13 0.11 0.14 0.12
reg5  - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.13  0.15  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.09
married  0.64 0.38 0.70 0.55 0.32 0.61  - - - 0.52 0.29 0.54 0.57 0.3  0.63 0.52 0.32  0.6
c.union  0.07 0.09  0.09  0.12 0.15 0.15  - - - 0.16 0.18  0.21 0.11  0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13
expl  0.25 0.53 0.17 0.31 0.57 0.24  - - - 0.02 0.07 0.01  - - - - - -
exp2  0.29 0.31 0.22 0.31 0.27 0.30  - - - 0.08 0.17 0.04  - - - - - -
exp3  0.19  0.09  0.21  0.15 0.10 0.18  - - - 0.14 0.20 0.08  - - - - - -
exp4  0.27 0.06 0.39 0.22 0.06 0.28  - - - 0.75 0.57 0.88  - - - - - -
Sample  3296 565  969 2499 584  884  19696  4859  5921 20052  6064 9306  1718 233  472  2165  360  586
Educi=educ+agei  where  Prima=  some  or completed  primary;  Secun=  some or complete  secondary
education;  Univ=  some  or complete  college;  Agel:= < 25 years,  Age2:  25-35  years,  Age3:  35-45  years;
Age4: age 2 45; servl=transp./commun./elect.&water,  serv2=fmance/real  estate/business  servs.,
public=public  adm./defense/education,  socia=  social  servs.,  other--pers.  serv./agricult.  & mining;  exp = less
28than 1 year  of tenure  (Arg)  exp.(BR),  exp2= 1-5  years,  exp3=  5-10  years,  exp4=  more  than 10 years.
29TABLE  3: Real Wage growth  and Sectoral  Wage  Differentials,  Men
ARGENTINA  Avg. % growth per year  Wage Differentials
1997/1988  1988  1997
quantiles  All  Formal  Informal  self-e  IS/FS  SE/FS  IS/FS  SE/FS
5%  1.8  2.5  1.0  -0.4  0.552  0.740  0.492  0.586
10%  1.9  2.7  4.9  0.0  0.536  0.841  0.621  0.679
25%  2.6  2.6  3.9  0.4  0.643  1.007  0.700  0.844
50%  2.6  2.6  4.2  1.3  0.627  1.058  0.698  0.960
75%  1.5  1.2  3.8  1.4  0.584  1.091  0.707  1.105
90%  0.9  0.5  4.6  2.9  0.489  1.097  0.666  1.332
95%  1.2  1.0  3.0  2.7  0.447  1.102  0.521  1.261
Mean  1.6  1.5  3.9  1.9  0.556  1.055  0.662  1.086
BRAZIL
1995/1989  1989  1995
quantiles  All  Formal  Informal  self-e  IS/FS  SE/FS  IS/FS  SE/FS
5%  7.2  4.9  12.7  6.4  0.463  0.714  0.630  0.764
10%  6.0  7.9  11.9  5.9  0.544  0.884  0.634  0.811
25%  7.8  8.6  6.8  6.4  0.600  0.976  0.558  0.893
50%  6.3  6.0  9.6  3.9  0.461  1.032  0.533  0.933
75%  2.9  3.4  8.9  0.9  0.385  1.026  0.491  0.900
90%  2.1  2.6  6.8  0.5  0.367  1.000  0.446  0.893
95%  2.1  2.1  4.6  2.1  0.393  0.889  0.444  0.889
Mean  3.4  3.8  6.6  2.3  0.426  0.984  0.486  0.914
COSTA RICA
1995/1989  1989  1995
quantiles  All  Formal  Informal  self-e  IS/FS  SE/NS  IS/FS  SE/FS
5  1.3  1.0  2.8  2.3  0.479  0.593  0.528  0.635
10  0.9  1.5  2.0  0.5  0.547  0.734  0.564  0.694
25  0.2  0.6  1.5  -0.5  0.591  0.820  0.623  0.768
50  0.8  0.7  1.4  0.1  0.603  0.901  0.630  0.874
75  0.7  1.1  0.8  1.9  0.552  0.896  0.540  0.935
90  2.1  2.0  2.2  2.8  0.493  0.976  0.501  1.019
95  2.7  2.0  4.3  3.5  0.463  0.964  0.520  1.039
Mean  1.1  1.2  1.8  1.1  0.550  0.916  0.569  0.911
30TABLE 4: Wage Growth Rates (per year) by Male Age-Education Group (%)
ARGENTINA  BRAZIL  COSTA RICA
A. Medians  1997/1988  1995/1989  1995/1989
All  formal  informal  self-e  All  formal  infornal  self-e  All  formal  informal  self-e
primal  3.3  2.9  6.5  -0.1  6.8  6.3  6.0  6.3  -0.2  0.1  -1.8  -1.5
prima2  2.3  3.0  2.0  2.3  4.7  4.3  5.9  5.2  -0.3  0.2  1.8  -2.4
prima3  2.2  2.3  2.2  0.9  7.0  7.9  11.8  5.6  0.0  0.3  6.6  1.4
secunl  1.2  0.6  4.8  4.7  5.1  4.7  8.4  4.8  -0.4  0.8  -2.2  -1.4
secun2  0.2  1.0  0.0  -0.3  2.9  3.0  6.8  2.1  0.0  -0.5  -0.4  -0.5
secun3  0.9  0.1  2.5  2.2  2.7  3.6  4.2  2.1  -3.5  -3.6  - -2.1
univl  2.4  1.8  6.1  - .1.8  -1.9  0.9  -6.8  1.7  1.5  - -
univ2  -1.2  -1.4  4.0  0.2  0.2  0.7  0.4  -1.0  -0.2  0.6  - -0.4
univ3  1.4  2.1  - 5.4  2.0  2.0  -3.0  4.5  0.0  3.5  - -
B. Means  1997/1988  1995/1989  1995/1989
All  formal informal  self-e  All  formal  informal  self-e  All  formal  informal  self-e
primal  3.5  2.7  5.9  2.9  5.0  4.4  7.8  2.0  -0.4  0.2  0.1  -4.0
prima2  1.8  2.1  2.6  1.1  3.2  3.3  6.0  1.9  -0.2  -0.3  4.1  -0.4
prima3  1.5  1.8  2.6  0.9  5.0  5.9  8.1  2.5  1.3  0.1  5.3  2.1
secunl  1.1  0.5  2.9  3.9  2.3  2.1  5.9  0.4  -0.2  0.2  -0.7  -6.2
secun2  -0.4  -0.2  -1.0  0.0  1.2  1.2  2.8  1.1  0.0  -0.5  3.9  1.6
secun3  0.3  -0.2  1.2  2.8  1.0  1.3  1.8  0.6  -0.9  -1.2  - -3.3
univl  2.7  2.1  8.3  - 0.0  0.1  -1.6  -0.6  1.5  1.9  - -
univ2  -1.0  -1.2  -1.4  -0.1  0.4  0.4  -0.4  0.8  0.8  0.9  - 5.6
univ3  0.7  0.8  - 1.2  2.1  2.0  -1.1  4.3  -2.3  -0.9  - -
--  small sample sizes.
31Figure 1: Comparisons of Distributions  of Real Wages by Sector of Employment
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33Figure  3: Comparisons  of Distributons  of Real  Wages  by  groups,  Brazil  _1989  --1995
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34Figure  3: Comparisons  of Distributions  of Real  Wages  by  groups,  Costa  Rica _1989  --1995
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35TABLE 5:  Change in Quantile Wage Differentials, Men (% per year)
07/RR  Arivpntinn  Q5/RQ  Rta7i]  Q5/RQ  rnctn  Rirn
auantiles  0.05  0.1  0.25  0.5  0.75  0.9  0.05  0.1  0.25  0.5  0.75  0.9  0.05  0.1  0.25  0.5  0.75  0.9
Intercept  3.00  4.44  3.74  2.32  0.51  -0.23  4.00  3.71  3.43  0.23  0.35  -1.56  0.63  2.76  7.56  3.45  -3.24  -2.19
primal  0.84  -0.25  2.43  1.79  1.56  2.51  2.95  1.72  2.01  2.74  2.03  3.45  -4.87  -1.81  -1.69  -1.08  4.08  4.33
prima2  -0.04  -0.34  0.75  0.95  0.77  1.43  3.51  2.39  2.74  2.14  0.61  2.20  1.59  -1.57  -1.77  -0.49  5.65  5.23
prima3  1.11  -0.40  1.01  0.58  0.28  1.68  4.08  3.15  4.16  3.17  1.68  3.71  -0.84  -0.41  0.00  -0.44  5.41  10.27
secunl  0.60  0.45  0.52  -0.13  -0.64  0.78  3.63  2.18  2.72  2.37  0.22  0.70  -0.49  -1.46  -2.32  -1.25  6.33  5.74
secun2  -0.96  -1.12  0.15  -0.24  -0.49  -0.69  4.06  1.99  1.99  0.89  -1.24  -0.02  0.30  -2.32  -2.41  -1.57  5.06  5.25
secun3  3.69  -0.07  0.78  -0.21  -0.46  1.27  2.60  1.30  1.15  -0.05  -1.93  -0.83  -1.74  -1.97  -3.61  -2.54  2.01  3.69
univl  -0.09  0.51  1.63  0.56  0.73  2.24  -0.64  -1.20  -1.40  -1.53  -2.63  0.65  3.57  1.83  -0.15  2.66  5.50  4.73
univ2  -1.79  -1.51  -1.49  -1.97  -2.01  -0.30  -0.15  -0.67  -1.10  -0.97  -1.48  -0.48  1.79  -0.17  -2.00  -2.38  2.83  6.13
manuf  0.19  1.47  0.03  0.62  2.12  0.84  -0.36  0.23  0.08  1.35  1.24  2.11  1.33  0.98  -1.45  0.17  2.01  -0.12
const  1.81  4.44  3.18  4.59  6.58  4.19  0.22  1.28  1.19  3.71  3.69  3.98  -0.05  -0.54  -0.84  1.28  3.77  4.80
retail  -1.14  0.08  -0.14  0.84  2.18  0.68  -0.51  0.35  0.34  2.07  2.33  3.35  1.19  0.18  -1.24  -0.77  -0.05  -1.19
servl  -0.44  1.70  -0.13  0.77  2.32  0.19  -1.91  -0.23  -1.60  0.27  0.59  1.08  0.34  -0.25  -1.36  -0.43  1.21  1.88
busi  -0.51  -0.31  -0.02  0.58  1.10  2.12
socia  3.44  2.35  2.05  2.27  2.82  1.10  -1.08  0.12  1.08  4.06  5.63  6.80  2.74  0.23  -0.48  0.71  2.43  1.53
other  -1.50  0.32  0.08  1.28  3.30  1.33  0.32  1.05  1.08  2.77  2.12  2.54  2.66  0.13  -0.70  0.61  2.60  1.26
public  3.23  2.51  1.53  1.98  4.04  2.11  -0.13  0.47  0.35  3.69  3.69  5.67  -2.16  -0.97  -2.12  -1.63  -0.12  -0.65
agric  1.24  0.13  -1.97  -1.19  -1.84  -1.16
unskilled  -2.85  -2.79  -2.68  -1.60  -1.29  -0.46  -1.22  -0.67  -0.36  0.58  0.42  -1.02  1.59  -0.30  -1.22  -1.71  -1.80  -3.41
skilled  -1.61  -2.61  -2.58  -1.77  -1.79  -1.72  -1.22  -1.14  -0.88  0.68  0.71  -0.35  0.42  0.20  -1.48  -2.44  -2.21  -4.07
info  -0.19  -0.27  0.20  0.56  0.35  1.49  2.99  1.70  0.94  0.92  1.14  2.22  0.71  -0.35  -1.22  -0.62  -0.25  1.01
self  -0.95  -1.35  -1.46  -0.58  -0.02  0.22  -1.25  -1.05  -1.11  -1.20  -1.36  -1.06  -0.23  -1.37  -1.91  -1.88  0.25  -0.36
married  0.35  1.02  -0.10  -0.07  -0.32  -0.38  0.94  3.92  0.27  0.13  1.81  0.77
c.union  -0.09  1.22  0.00  -0.58  -1.30  -1.50  1.51  3.01  -1.34  -1.20  -0.73  -1.05
head  -1.25  -1.09  -0.26  -0.40  -0.30  -0.32  -1.05  -1.54  -1.57  -2.13  -2.32  -2.58  -1.50  -2.26  0.58  1.14  -1.25  0.47
black  0.68  0.40  0.22  0.85  0.70  0.51
mulato  0.32  0.39  0.70  1.12  1.55  0.91
asian  -2.63  0.30  1.15  3.85  2.52  4.06
reg2  0.22  0.07  -0.80  -1.00  -1.05  -0.99  -1.48  -1.03  -0.94  -0.69  0.49  0.87
reg3  -1.46  -0.91  -1.50  -1.34  -1.13  -0.18  -0.33  0.25  -0.88  0.56  -0.86  -2.72
reg4  -3.29  -2.12  -1.84  0.25  -0.46  0.37
regS  -3.20  -2.00  -1.77  -0.67  -1.40  0.07
expl  -0.04  -0.68  -0.37  -0.30  0.13  0.19
exp2  1.72  0.53  0.66  1.11  0.83  1.63
exp3  0.59  0.56  0.60  0.15  0.02  0.90
Note: a negative (positive) sign indicates an increase (a reduction) in the gap, ie., a relative wage deterioration (improvement).References
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Informal: Infornal  salaried info are defined as men working in small firms (less than 6
workers) without work insurance and retirement plan coverage (Argentina) or without social
security coverage from employers (Costa Rica), or those without a signed federal card -excluding
public servants- (Brazil). The self-employed self are those that report to be "cuenta propias".
Age-Education: Age-education dummies are defined as follows: Educi= educ and agei
where educ refers to the last level of education achieved (prima= some or complete primary;
secun= some or complete secondary education; univ= some or complete college), and age refers
to the i-th age group (agel := 15-25 years, age2: 25-45 years, age3: 45-70 years). For example,
secunl corresponds to workers with some or complete secondary education and age 15-25.
Tenure in the occupation (Argentina): less than 1 year in the current occupation (expl),
between 1 and 5 (exp2) years, between 5 and 10 (exp3) years and more than 10 years (exp4).
Industry: These  dummies  are manuf,  const, retail, servl,  serv2, socia, pub  and  other.
Manuf refers to men working in the production of food, beverages, cigarettes, textiles, clothing,
chemical and metallic products, and other manufacturing; const to construction jobs;  retail to
jobs on commerce (including restaurants and hotels); servl  to jobs in utilities, transportation and
communication;  serv2 to jobs  in  finance, real state and professional services; socia  to those
working in social services, excluding public social services; pub to jobs in public administration,
defense and public social services (Argentina and Brazil), or to jobs in the public sector including
the descentralized government (Costa Rica). Finally, other is a residual dummy that groups jobs
in all other sectors (agriculture, mining and personal services). In Brazil available survey data
allows to identify business professional services jobs separately (busi dummy) from finance and
real estate.
Regional: In Brazil three regional dummies were included: regl  (southeast), reg2 (south),
and  reg3 (northeast).  The southeast dummy includes Minas Gerais,  Rio  de  Janeiro and  Sao
Paulo,  the  south  dummy  includes  Parana  and  the  northeast  region  includes  Bahia,  Ceara,
Pernarbuco  and  Maranhao.  In  Costa  Rica  we  included  five  regional  dummies:  regl
(Metropolitan area), reg2 (rest of Central Region), reg3 (Chorotega and Brunca), reg4 (Central
Pacific) and reg5 (Atlantic and Northern Huertar regions).
Occupations: Each occupational dummy groups men according to three different levels of
skills based on self-reported occupations: profe, skilled and unskilled. The first dummy groups
men that reported to be working in jobs that require professional qualifications, skilled  groups
those that reported to be working in administrative (white collar) jobs, and  unskilled refers to
men that reported to be working in jobs of low qualification. In Costa Rica a dummy for a few
workers reporting occupations in agriculture (agric) was included.
Miscelaneous: The dummies for marital status married and  consensual union  c.union as
well as the race dummies for Brazil (asian, black, mulato, white) are based on self-reports. The
household heads dummy head refer to men who report to be heads of households with at least
two members.APPENDIX II: Quantile Regression
In this  section we present some basic results on the quantile regression methods used in
this work.4 ' Consider the following linear model:
Y=X,B+u  (1)
where  u  is  a  vector  of  independent  error  terms whose  i-th  component  has  an  unspecified
distribution function F,. Given the usual conditional orthogonality assumption on the error term,
Ordinary Least Squares regression provides a model for the conditional mean of Y given by:
E[YIX]=  Xl  (2)
In  the special  case of  iid errors this  Least Squares estimate together  with  some  measure  of
dispersion  would  usually  provide  a  complete  characterization  of  (1).42 Nevertheless,  it  is
increasingly recognized that the iid linear model is not well suited to  analyze problems which
involve very heterogeneous populations.
Quantile regressions provide a very useful alternative by providing models for different
percentiles of Fyl., the conditional distribution of Y  given X. For (1) the r-th conditional quantile
of Y is given by:
Qr=  x,p(r)  (3)
where the orthogonality condition on u is now assumed for Q,(ulX), that is, the t-th conditional
quantile  of  the  error  term  is  assumed to  be  zero. This  gives  rise  to  a family  of  (quantile)
regression  curves,  one  for  each  r,  which  provide  a  more  complete  characterization  of  the
relationship  between  Y and X. Quantile regression also offers the usual robustness properties
associated with ordinary sample quantiles, particularly robustness to outlying observations in  Y.
In the case of the iid linear model the conditional quantile functions given in (3) will be parallel
vertical displacenments  of one another, and only robustness arguments would lead one to prefer
alternative estimators  of location other than OLS. The most  interesting case arises  when  the
estimated P(T) coefficients differ systematically across zs, suggesting that the marginal effect of
a particular explanatory variable varies across different quantiles of the conditional distribution
of Y.
Estimation of the 8(r)  coefficients known as "regression quantiles" is based on a sample
of n observations of Y  and p explanatory variables collected in the matrix X. It can be shown that
estimates of ,B(r)  can be obtained as solutions to the following linear programming problem:
min  [r  11 u + (I-T)  1'  n V  Xv  8 + u-v  =  Y]  (13)
(,6,  u, v)  e RPxR2
where  1  ',  is an ri vector of ones and u and v are the positive and negative parts of the residual
vector.  In  practice,  an  adaptation  of  the  Barrodale-Roberts algorithm  for  the  least  absolute
deviation problem makes computation now comparable to least squares methods for reasonable
41 See  Koenker  and Portnoy  (1997) for a recent  comprehensive  overview  of the topic.
42 If additionally,  F, is assumed  to be Gaussian,  then OLS  yields the optimal  estimator  of location  for the linear
model  (1).size data sets. Substantial computational time improvement for very large data sets has recently
been accomplished through interior point methods (Koenker and Portnoy (1997)).
Inference on the  (tr)'s can be based on the following result. Let b, = (bn(-),  ... bn('m))  be
a pm  vector of p  estimated regression quantile coefficients for m different quantiles based on a
sample  of n iid  observations; and  let ,3 be  its population counterpart. Under  some regularity
conditions Koenker and Basset (1978) showed that:
4n (b, - +)  > N(O,  Q  j&  Qo-&)  (14)
where Q  is a m x m matrix with typical element:
co)j  = (min (r  , rj ) - -rT  Tj  )  /  [ f( F1 (Trj)  ) f( F'(Trj) ) ]  (15)
Qo =  plim n- 1 (XX), a positive definite matrix, and 0  denotes the Kronecker product. Confidence
intervals can be easily constructed based on this result. General linear hypothesis like Ho: Hr3=h
can be tested using the following Wald-type statistic:
T. = (H b. - h)' [ H (Q X  (X'X)-') H' ]-  (H bn - h)  (16)
which under the null hypothesis has a x 2 distribution with rank(H) degrees of freedom. This
approach requires the estimation of the nuisance parameter 1 / f(F-'(r))  (called  sparsity) which
measures the inverse of the density of the observations around the r-th quantile. This is usually
accomplished based on estimates of the empirical quantile function constructed from residuals of
the --th quantile regression and using smoothing techniques.
An  altemative  approach  to  inference  that  takes  advantage  of  the  quantile  regression
formulation  can  be  based  on  rank  tests.  These tests  are  robust  to  outliers  in  Y and  are
asymptotically distribution free since they do not require the estimation of nuisance parameters
depending on the error distribution, and are not more complicated to compute than those based
on sparsity estimation. 43. Let X=[1:X 1 :X 2]  and suppose we are interested in testing the linear
hypothesis Ho: P2  = 0 vs Ho: P2 ￿  0. The following statistic:
W = (YT'M  X2 (X2 NM  X2)'  X2'M Yr) /  A  (17)
has an asymptotic %2 (q) distribution under the null hypothesis, where Yr is an estimated vector of
ranks of the observations,  M = I - XI (X X, )  Xl  and A is a quantity that does not depend on
the distribution of the errors. Visual inspection suggests that the rank-based test is very similar to
Lagrange multiplier tests where the yi's play the role of the square residuals. The estimation of the
ranks vector can be obtained as a by-product of the computation of the regression quantiles for
the linear model under the restricted model. Based on the well known duality between hypothesis
testing and construction of confidence intervals, a test to evaluate the significance  of a  single
variable can be  inverted to  obtain a confidence  interval for each  coefficient."  We used  this
approach to construct confidence intervals for the vector of quantile regression coefficients.
43 Since we do not attempt  to summarize  the theory  of such  tests  here we refer  to Koenker  and Portnoy  (1997) and
Koenker  (1994)  for a review  and relevant  references.
44Koenker  (1994)  discusses  in detail computational  and theoretical  advantages  as well as montecarlo  results  in favor
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